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Abstract
This paper investigates the eciency of monetary and scal policy in a two-country general
equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and wage stickiness. When monopoly distortions
are completely eliminated, we nd that stochastic government spending can aect the eciency
of the global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages. When the
stochastic government spending is present, we nd that the monopoly distortions can also aect the
eciency of the global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages. The
combination of proportional subsidy policies used to completely eliminate monopoly distortions and
the monetary policy replicating the real allocation under exible wages can be improved after we
introduce the stochastic government spending. Fiscal policy is found to be unable to replicate the
real allocation under exible wages.
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1. Introduction
Much recent research has focused on the choice of optimal monetary policy in open economies
with imperfect competition and price stickiness.1 One of conclusions of the research is that the
optimal global monetary policy involves replicating the real allocation under exible prices, see
Obstfeld and Rogo (hereafter referred to as OR, 2000, 2002), Devereux and Engel (hereafter
referred to as DE, 2003) for the case of PCP2, Benigno and Benigno (hereafter BB, 2003) under
some restrictive conditions, among many others. Equivalently, the conclusion means that the
monetary policy replicating the real allocation under exible prices is ecient. The point is easy to
understand, inter alia, exible prices can induce an ecient allocation of resources across dierent
uses and times.
Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 1062288992; fax: + 86 1062288376.
Email addresses: wangchanist@gmail.com (Chan Wang), zouhengfu@gmail.com (Heng-fu Zou)
1A nonexhaustive list includes Obstfeld and Rogo (1995, 2000, 2001, 2002), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002),
Devereux and Engel (2003), Benigno, G and Benigno, P (2003), Benigno, P (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005),
Gali, and Monacelli (2005), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2011), Engel (2011), among many others.
2PCP is the abbreviation of producer currency pricing. By comparison, another specication is local currency
pricing or LCP
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under exible prices is ecient or not when we introduce stochastic government spending shocks
in OR (2000) for a more realistic purpose. Though the practice is similar to that adopted in the
recent literature on the interactions between monetary and scal policy in open economies3, the
scal role played by the government in our analysis is dierent. We just assume that the government
spending is exogenously given shock not as a stabilization tool when we analyze the eciency of
the monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages4.
We nd that the conclusion found in OR (2000, 2002) and DE (2003) for the case of PCP can't be
generalized without restriction after stochastic government spending is introduced, even for a special
case in which the government uses the monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible
wages and constant government spending shares. Under the condition log(1   gc) < E log(1   g)
and log(1   g
c) < E log(1   g),5 the global monetary policy can be Pareto improved when some
requirements are satised. The reason behind the possible improvement is that the adverse inuence
of stochastic government spending shares on individual's utility under sticky wages is less than that
of constant government spending shares on individual's utility under exible wages. When the
requirements are not satised, however, the global monetary policy is ecient. Under the condition
log(1   gc) > E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g), the conclusion found in OR (2000,
2002) and DE (2003) for the case of PCP can be generalized without restriction in our setting.
The introduction of stochastic government spending can change the conclusion that obtained in
OR (2000, 2002) and DE (2003) for the case of PCP. An implied result in OR (2000, 2002) is that
the global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages when monopoly
distortions are completely eliminated by government's proportional subsidy policies is ecient.
However, after we introduce the stochastic government spending, the result can be overturned un-
der some conditions. The key is that the monopoly distortions both in labor and output markets
will decrease the disutility from labor when the wages are sticky, and the presence of stochastic
government spending causes the benet of a lower disutility from labor to outweigh adverse ef-
fect of monopoly distortions on expected utility from consumption. The complete elimination of
monopoly distortions in labor and output markets will remove the potentially large gains when the
government spending is present. Consequently, it leaves the room for exogenous monetary policy to
Pareto improve one that replicates the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic govern-
ment spending shares when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated. Otherwise, the global
monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government
spending shares but without monopoly distortions is ecient.
After we introduce the stochastic government spending, the monopoly distortions turn to be
important for the eciency of the global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under
exible wages. As emphasized in the last paragraph, one of our conclusions is that the global
monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government
spending shares when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated by government's propor-
tional subsidy policies can be Pareto improved under some conditions. By comparison, the global
3A partial list includes Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Kirsanova et al. (2007),
Gali and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero (2009), among many others.
4OR (2000) assumes sticky nominal wages but perfect exible output prices and believes that it is more closer to
the reality.
5Here g denotes Home stochastic government spending share and gc Home constant government spending share.
In addition, g and g
c are their Foreign counterparts respectively (Foreign variables are denoted by asterisks).
2monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government
spending shares when the government leaves the monopoly distortions to be intact is ecient.
In OR (2000, 2002), the monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages
when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated can bring the individual the highest expected
utility. After introducing the stochastic government spending, we depart from the conclusion and
show that the expected utility provided by global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation
under exible wages and stochastic government spending shares when monopoly distortions are
completely eliminated is lower than that provided by the same global monetary policy accompanied
by specially-chosen subsidy policies. However, the global monetary policy accompanied by the
specially-chosen subsidy policies can also be Pareto improved by exogenous monetary policy when
some conditions are satised. Otherwise, it is ecient.
One potential merit of our introducing stochastic government spending is that we can analyze
the endogenous global scal policy. We assume that the government can endogenously choose the
scal policy as a stabilization tool after observing the productivity shocks and monetary shocks.
Our treatment to the endogenous scal policy is similar to that appearing in recent literature on
the interactions between monetary and scal policy in open economies, but our treatment to the
monetary policy (as exogenously given shock) is dierent. However, similar to what obtained in
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), the endogenous scal policy can't replicate the real allocation
under exible wages.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 through 4 generalize the new open-economy macroe-
conomics model of OR (2000) by introducing the stochastic government spending; Section 5 analyzes
the eciency of endogenous global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible
wages; Section 6 analyzes the endogenous scal policy; Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
We extend the model developed by OR (2000) by introducing stochastic government spending.
The setup and the notation are similar to that of OR (2000). The world consists of two countries
with equal size, Home and Foreign. Production of dierentiated goods requires a continuum of
dierentiated labor inputs indexed by [0;1]. Domestic tradable goods are represented by the interval
[0;1], while Foreign's tradables are represented by [1;2]. In addition, each country produces a
continuum of dierentiated nontraded goods represented by [0;1]. Workers provide dierentiated
labor services to rms as monopolistic suppliers that are represented by the interval [0;1]. And
as in OR (2000) and other recent research, we focus on a single period which is justied by the
equality of Home and Foreign per capita consumption of tradables and perfect international sharing
of consumption risks in tradable goods.
2.1. Preferences






















[LH (i;j) + LN (i;j)]dj
and v > 1.7 In (1), M is exogenous stochastic monetary supply, K is stochastic Home productivity
shock. For convenience, we assume that stochastic Foreign productivity shock K has symmetric
but not necessarily independent distribution. For any individual i; the overall consumption index
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where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods and also an index of monopolistic


















































7Here we make a slight modication to OR (2000) to leave the case  = 1 out of consideration. The assumption
that , the degree of convexity of eort cost, is strictly greater than unity is also adopted in lots of literature, such

































We assume that the government spending index takes the same form as the individual's and



























where g is a exogenous stochastic variable, and GH and GN are indexes of government spending
on tradables and nontradables respectively. We also assume that the government behaves compet-



































which is standard in MIU models but assumption of one-period need to be taken into account.
8Here g represents the size of government which appears in Barro (1990) but in a stochastic sense. In additon, in
line with Beetsma and Jensen (2005), we assume complete home bias in government spending.
52.2. Firms



















where Y (j) denotes rm j0s output and L(i;j) rm j0s demand for labor i; and  > 1 is substitution
elasticity between labors and also a (decreasing) index of imperfect competition. Foreign production
functions have the identical structures except that tradables produced by Foreign are denoted by
YF (j) (j 2 [1;2]):

















2.3. Asset markets and budget constraints
All domestic prots and initial stock of the domestic currency are shared equally by Home
individuals. And as explained in OR (2000), it does't exist ex ante equity trade between Home and
Foreign.
Home individual i has the following budget constraint
Mi + PCi + PT = Mi
0 + W (i)Li +
Z 1
0
[H (j) + N (j)]dj; (8)
where H and N are prots payed by rms and T is per capita lump-sum tax denominated by
composite consumption good.
The government's budget constraint is
M   M0 + PT = PHGH + PNGN:
3. Equilibrium Price and Wage Setting
Workers set nominal wages at the beginning of the period and the wages are sticky during the
period.
63.1. Optimal wage setting
















The above equation is identical to that in OR (2000) and has the same interpretation.
3.2. price setting, the real exchange rate and the terms of trade
That monopolistic rms will charge a constant markup over wages and the law of one price
holds implies

















The real exchange rate is









and the terms of trade is








3.3. Output market clearing
The clearing of Home market for nontradables implies that CN = (1   g)YN. As for tradables,









T; from which (1   g)PHYH = (1   g)PFYF follows. The budget constraints and market
clearing for nontradables imply that PTCT = (1   g)PHYH and EP
TC
T = PTC
T = (1   g)PFYF,
from which CT = C
T follows. This result appears in OR (2000, 2001, 2002), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001) and Devereux and Engel (2003) when PCP holds. As emphasized in OR (2002), in general
case of CRRA consumption preference, CT = C
T can't guarantee ecient international sharing of
consumption risks in tradable goods. But here we stick with OR (2000), the utility separability
between tradables and nontradables implies perfect risk sharing in tradable goods when CT = C
T
holds.
As in OR (2000, 2002), CT = C
T doesn't imply the equality of the overall consumption indexes






to Foreign spending Z. The result follows from PN
PT =
(1 )CT
CN , Z = CT





3.4. Equilibrium preset wages




















































As we show in the following, Eqs. (13) and (14) will lead to a simple closed-form solution.
4. A closed-form solution
In this section,we can solve the model analytically by assuming the exogenous stochastic shocks
fm;m;;;log(1   g);log(1   g)g follow jointly normal distribution, where m = logM;m =
logM; = logK; = logK:In the following, we suppose lower case letters denote natural logs
and E = E and 2
 = 2
. As showed in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), we solve the model
under the condition that voluntary participation constraints hold. It means that the variances of
the shocks are suciently small.
4.1. Solutions for expected terms of trade and world spending
Taking logs to Eq. (14) yields
E = Ee + w   w =  ez  
1
2
(e + e)   (z   z) +
(   1)























z log(1 g)   z log(1 g)

(15)
in which  is the log terms of trade (TOT). The log real exchange rate is given by (1   ).
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Eqs. (15) and (16) are identical to their counterparts in OR (2000) if the government spending
disappears, and have the same explanations. After we introduce the government spending, the
immediately above two expressions give us some additional intuitions to explain how uncertain-
ties aect the expected terms of trade and the expected expenditure levels measured in units of
tradables.
From Eq. (15), A positive covariance between productivity shock  and 1 g (remaining output
fraction to individuals after government buys fraction g) encourages labor eort, because it means
that the demand for Home labor is low when the disutility from labor is high. As a result, Home
individuals set a relatively lower wages, and the fact that the Home produces more deteriorates the
8Home's expected terms of trade E: The explanations of the eects of elog(1 g) and z log(1 g) on
E are similar. The increase of Eg will aect the Home's expected TOT via the term E log(1   g) 9.
A higher expected government spending in all states will aect expected output by two dierent
ways. For one thing, a higher expected government spending will increase the demand for labor
and encourage the individual to set a relatively higher wage, higher wage will depress the output.
For another, with wage preset ex ante, a higher expected government spending will induce the rm
to produce more. The net eect of a higher expected government spending on the expected output
depends on the balance of depressing eect of higher ex ante wage and direct stimulating eect
of higher expected government spending.10 Anyway, a higher expected government spending will
crowd out expected private consumption.11 A resulting lower Home output allocated for private
transaction in tradables, however, doesn't mean that Home's expected TOT will improve for sure.
The eect of expected government spending on Home's expected TOT depends on whether Home
expected government spending exceeds that of the Foreign or not. If the answer is yes, the domestic
private tradables will be scarcer as a result of a larger crowding eect, consequently, the Home's
expected TOT will improve. Now we analyze the eect of the variance of the government spending
share g on the Home's expected TOT. A higher volatility of government spending share will only
produce the depressing eect on the expected output by higher ex ante preset wage. Consequently,
the increase of the volatility of the government spending share will lower the output, thus, the
tradables for private transaction and improve the Home's expected TOT.12 Explanations of eects
of new terms in Eq. (16) on expected spending measured in terms of tradables are also similar to
those of eects they have on the expected terms of trade.
4.2. Ex post spending, the ex post exchange rate and nominal wage levels
Now we solve ex post spending and ex post exchange rate to obtain absolute nominal wage
levels and express the variances of the endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous shocks.
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9A higher value of Eg implies a more negative value of E log(1   g).
10The equation Ey =  E log(1   g) + 1
2E + Ez shows that the increase of the expected value of g will result in
a higher stimulating eect, thus, a higher expected output.
11From the equation Ec = Ez +
1 
2 E and the expressions for Ez and E, the statement holds obviously.
12Of course, the statement holds under the condition that the volatility of domestic government spending share is
larger than that of the Foreign.
9It's noteworthy that the government spending doesn't aect ex post spending level z, and ex
post exchange rate e directly. The government spending aects these two terms through its eects
on predetermined wages which are the functions of the expected spending level Ez and expected
terms of trade E, by Eqs.(15) and (16); both Ez and E are aected by government spending.
4.3. solutions for variances
Before we solve for covariances in Eqs. (15) and (16) to express the endogenous variables in
terms of exogenous parameters, we assume that both monetary policy and scal spending don't
respond to productivity shocks and monetary policy and scal spending don't respond to each other.
These assumptions mean that e, e, z, z, log(1 g),  log(1 g), elog(1 g), elog(1 g),
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Later, we will consider the endogenous monetary policies and scal policies.
4.4. Solving explicitly for expected utilities
When analyzing the welfare implications of policy rules, we consider the limiting case as  ! 0
which means that the derived utility from real balances is small relative to that from private
consumption.
4.4.1. Expected utilities under sticky wages, stochastic government spending shares and monopoly
distortions
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[(2   )E log(1   g) + E log(1   g)] + 
 + ; (22)
where 




















[(2   )z + z]  
1
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 is identical to that in OR (2000) which reects the eects of monetary policies, it's
eects on the expected utility of Home typical individual remain the same. However, comparing
with it's counterpart in OR (2000), Eq.(22) has a new term  which, together with the terms
E log(1   g); E log(1   g) and 2
log(1 g); reect the eects of government spending on the expected
utility level. We analyze the eects of E log(1   g) on EU to illustrate the channels through which
the scal policy aects the expected utility level. A higher expected government spending share
g, as analyzed before, will be expected to crowd out consumption, thus, result in a lower expected
utility level. The eect is reected by the term
( 1)
2 [(2   )E log(1   g) + E log(1   g)]. In










, a higher expected
government spending share will cause more disutility from labor.13 A more volatile government
spending share will induce the individual to set a higher wage, lower expected output caused









. In addition, as reected by the term










a more volatile government spending share will produce more disutility from labor.14 A positive
covariance between  and 1 g will, as explained before, induce the individual to set a lower wage.
Consequently, the individual will obtain more utility from consumption since the rm will produce
more output. The eects of elog(1 g) and z log(1 g) on the expected utility level can be analyzed
similarly.
The Foreign typical individual's expected utility is given by the following
13From Eq. (9) and PC = (1   g) 
 1WL, a higher expected government spending will raise the expected marginal
utility of real wage by the crowding-out eect, therefore, increase the labor oered by the individual.
14Similar to explanation in the last footnote, a more volatile government spending share will raise the expected
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[E log(1   g) + (2   )E log(1   g)] + 
 + ; (23)
where 
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z log(1 g) + (2   )z log(1 g)

:
The analysis of the eects of new terms on the Foreign individual's expected utility is the same
as what we conduct for the Home individual.
Notice here the way the monopoly distortion term
(' 1)( 1)
' enters the utility function is dier-
ent from that in OR (2000). The point is essential to change the main conclusion obtained in OR
(2000), it will become apparent later. And as in OR (2000), the parameters  and ' do not enter
the terms 
, 
,  and .
4.4.2. Expected utilities under exible wages, constant government spending shares and monopoly
distortions
In order to compare with the conclusion in OR (2000), we consider a special case in which
government spending share is a constant. Let upper bars denote variables with exible wages,
constant government spending shares and monopoly distortions. The Home and Foreign outputs
in this circumstance are respectively
 Y =  L =

('   1)(   1)





 Y  =  L =

('   1)(   1)





in which gc represents constant government spending share. Taking logs to Eqs.(24) and (25) and





@ =   1
 < 0; which means that a positive
12productivity shock will result in a higher output. In addition, we have
@ y
@gc = 1







c) > 0, which mean that a higher government spending share will lead to more output. The
intuition is that a higher government spending share will crowd out the individual's consumption
and increase the marginal utility of consumption, a higher marginal utility of consumption induces
the individual to oer more labor. The expected utility of the Home typical individual in this
circumstance is
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[(2   )log(1   gc) +  log(1   g
c)];
(26)
and it's Foreign counterpart is
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[ log(1   gc) + (2   )log(1   g
c)]:
(27)
4.4.3. Expected utilities under exible wages, stochastic government spending shares but without
monopoly distortions
Monopoly distortions can be eliminated completely by giving individuals a proportional wage
subsidy of 1
' 1 and rms a proportional production subsidy of 1
 1. When monopoly distortions
are eliminated completely and wages are exible, the Home and Foreign outputs are respectively15
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@ =   1
 < 0,
@^ y
@g = @^ l
@g = 1
(1 g) > 0 and
@^ y
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(1 g) > 0. The expressions can also be explained similarly.
The Home individual's expected utility in this circumstance is
















[(2   )E log(1   g) + E log(1   g)];
(30)
and it's Foreign counterpart is
15Here we let the hats denote the variables with exible wages, stochastic government spending shares when
monopoly distortions are eliminated.
















[E log(1   g) + (2   )E log(1   g)]:
(31)
4.4.4. Expected utilities under exible wages, stochastic government spending shares and monopoly
distortions
Let tildes denote variables with exible wages, stochastic government spending shares and
monopoly distortions. It's easy to show that the Home and Foreign outputs in this circumstance
are the following respectively
~ Y = ~ L = ~ LH + ~ LN =

(   1)('   1)
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F + ~ L
N =
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(1 g) > 0, and the interpretations remain the same.
The Home typical individual's expected utility in this circumstance is
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)E log(1   g) + E log(1   g)]; (34)
and it's Foreign counterpart is
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[E log(1   g) + (2   )E log(1   g)]: (35)
What contrasts with the conclusion in OR (2000) is that, in general, E ~ U doesn't equal E ~ U,
even though the condition E = E is imposed. Except that in special case that the distributions




145. Eciency of global monetary policy
Before presenting the formal analysis, we should emphasize that whenever we say monetary
policies are ecient, it means that they are constrained-ecient, in the sense claried in OR (2000)
(i.e. maximizing an average of Home and Foreign expected utilities subject to optimal behaviors of
the players in the model). In addition, when the government endogenously chooses the monetary
policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, we take the scal spending as shocks
and assume that the government can observe the productivity shocks K;K and the scal spending
shocks g and g.
In order to compare with the conclusion in OR (2000,2002), DE (2003) and BB (2003), i.e. the
monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible prices is ecient. We consider
rst the case in which that the government uses monetary policy to replicate the real allocation
under exible wages, constant government spending shares and monopoly distortions. In order to
keep some degree of symmetry between Home and Foreign, we analyze the eciency of endoge-
nous global monetary policy in the following three cases: Case 1: log(1   gc) = E log(1   g) and
log(1   g
c) = E log(1   g); Case 2:log(1   gc) > E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g);
Case 3:log(1   gc) < E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) < E log(1   g):
Proposition 1. If the government keeps the monopoly distortions to be intact and chooses endoge-
nously monetary policy after observing both the productivity shocks K;K and scal spending shocks
g and g, Then
(1):The Home monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, constant
government spending shares is
m = Em +
1
2"




f(2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) +  (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g;
(36)
and it's Foreign counterpart is
m = Em +
1
2"




f (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) + (2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g:
(37)
(2):The global monetary policy given by Eqs. (36) and (37) is ecient when log(1   gc) >
E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g):
(3):The global monetary policy given by Eqs. (36) and (37) can be Pareto improved when
log(1   gc) < E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) < E log(1   g); if
1
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 [log(1   gc)   E log(1   g)] + (2   )[log(1   g





























m   2mm + 2
m

> 0: Or inequality (38)
with sign > replacing sign > and inequality (39) with sign > replacing sign > hold simultaneously.
Otherwise, the global monetary policy given by Eqs. (36) and (37) is ecient.
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log outputs under sticky wages, stochastic government spending shares and monopoly distortions
are y = z   1
2 (w   e   w)   log(1   g) and y = z + 1
2 (w   e   w)   log(1   g) respectively.
Then Eqs. (36) and (37) can be obtained after we equate  y to y and  y to y, and express z and e
in terms of m and m.
(2): Suppose that there exists other global monetary policy such that both EU > E  U and
EU > E  U hold or both EU > E  U and EU > E  U hold. From the Eqs. (19), (20), (21), (22),
(23), (26) and (27), that both EU > E  U and EU > E  U hold means
1



















































































hold simultaneously. Under the conditions that ' > 1,  > 1,  > 1, 0 6  6 1, " > 0,
E log(1   g) < 0, E log(1   g) < 0, log(1   gc) < 0, log(1   g
c) < 0, 2
 > 0, 2
z > 0, 2
e > 0,
2
log(1 g) > 0, 2
log(1 g) > 0, log(1   gc) > E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g), the sum
16of the right-hand side of the inequality (40) is strictly greater than zero, but the rst term of the
left-hand side of the inequality (40) is strictly less than zero. The same is true for the inequality
(41). Therefore, neither inequalities holds if  = 1 or 2
m = 2
m. If 0 6  < 1 and 2
m > 2
m,
the inequality (40) doesn't hold. If 0 6  < 1 and 2
m < 2
m, the inequality (41) doesn't hold. In
sum, it's impossible for inequalities (40) and (41) to hold simultaneously. Similarly, EU > E  U and
EU > E  U can't hold simultaneously. The above analysis contradicts the hypothesis that there
exists other global monetary policy to Pareto improve one given by Eqs. (36) and (37).







to both sides of inequalities (38) and (39) respec-
tively and then rearranging yield EU > E  U and EU > E  U. Similarly, we can obtain EU > E  U
and EU > E  U. Either case means that there exists other global monetary policy that Pareto
dominates one given by Eqs. (36) and (37).
When there is no scal spending, i.e. log(1   gc) = E log(1   g) =log(1   g
c) = E log(1   g) =
0, the rst two conclusions of Proposition 1 will degenerate into those obtained in OR (2000). In
general case in which there exists government spending, Proposition 1 tells us to what extent the
conclusion in OR (2000) can be generalized. The second conclusion of Proposition 1 implies that
the global monetary policy given by Eqs. (36) and (37) is ecient when log(1   gc) > E log(1   g)
and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g) are satised. What's the reason that the result obtained in OR
(2000) hold in this case? Roughly speaking, under the conditions log(1   gc) > E log(1   g) and
log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g), the adverse inuences of stochastic g and g on EU are greater than
those of constant gc and g
c on E  U16, and the same is true for the Foreign. Though a lower variance
of Home exogenous monetary policy than that of Foreign will increase EU17, opposite eect of it on
EU makes it impossible for the eects of exogenous monetary policies to exceed those of exogenous
scal policies in both countries simultaneously. Consequently, the global monetary policy given by
(36) and (37) is ecient.
However, under conditions log(1   gc) < E log(1   g) and log(1   g
c) < E log(1   g), the
adverse inuences of stochastic g and g on EU are less than those of constant gc and g
c on
16The condition log(1   gc) > E log(1   g) means that g is greater than gc with a high probability. Similarly, g
is greater than g
c with a high probability. The eect of gc on the expected disutility from labor in E  U is 1
1 gc ,
the eect of stochastic g on the expected disutility from labor in EU, however, is exp







By the known condition, we have 1
1 gc < exp






. The eects of gc and g
c on expect-
ed utility from consumption in E  U is
( 1)
2 [(2   )log(1   gc) +  log(1   g
c)], the eects of stochastic g and
g on the expected utility from consuption in EU, however, is
( 1)








. By the known conditions, we have
(   1)
2












[(2   )log(1   gc) +  log(1   g
c)]:
Therefore, the adverse eects of stochastic g and g on EU are greater than those of constant gc and g
c on E  U.
17A lower variance of Home exogenous monetary policy than that of Foreign implies negative covariance between
z and e ,the negative covariance will deteriorate expected TOT,as a result, nontradables are cheaper. Given total
spending z measured in tradables, higher real consumption resulting from cheaper nontradables will bring higher
expected utility.
17E  U, and the same is true for the Foreign. It's the point that makes it possible for exogenous
monetary policies to Pareto improve endogenous monetary policies given in Eqs. (36) and (37).
What conditions should Pareto-improving exogenous monetary policies satisfy? Eqs. (38) and
(39) are more likely to be satised when the followings take place: Both exogenous monetary
and scal policies are less volatile; the productivity shocks are less volatile; the variances of both
Home and Foreign exogenous monetary policies are not only small but also close in values; the
government spending shares are expected to be small and the covariance between the Home and
Foreign exogenous monetary policies is small. Considering the voluntary participation constraints
imposed in our model, these conditions are relevant. When the government spending shares are
less volatile, the disutility from labor will be lower and the utility from consumption will be higher
in calculating EU and EU. Less volatility of the monetary policies will increase EU and EU
, because they will lead to a higher expected output measured in tradables z. Less volatility of
the monetary policies also imply that the eect of the monetary policies on expected TOT is
small.18 Pareto-improving exogenous monetary policies will insure that the possible adverse eect
of the monetary policies on TOT 19is too small to dominate the benecial eects of the scal and
monetary policies on EU and EU.
A further investigation into OR (2000) reveals that the combination of subsidy policies and mon-
etary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages can replicate the real allocation
under exible wages but without monopoly distortions.20 The resulting allocation will provide the
individual higher expected utility than that provided by using only monetary policy that replicates
the real allocation under exible wages. In addition, the global monetary policy in this circumstance
is ecient. Do the same conclusions hold after we introduce stochastic government spending?
Proposition 2. Both Home and Foreign governments can replicate the real allocation under ex-
ible wages, stochastic government spending shares but without monopoly distortions by giving a
proportional wage subsidy of 1
' 1 and production subsidy of 1
 1 to eliminate monopoly distortions
and choosing endogenously monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages and
stochastic government spending shares after observing both productivity shocks K, K and scal
spending shocks g and g.
(1): The Home monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, stochastic
government spending shares is
m = Em +
1
2"








f(2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) +  (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g;
(42)
18Noticing that the eect of expected TOT on EU is opposite to that of it on EU.
19Whether the eect is benecial or adverse depends on the comparison between 2
m and 2
m
20In order to get rid of monopoly distortions, the government need to give workers a proportional wage subsidy of
1
' 1 and rms a proportional production subsidy of 1
 1.
18and it's Foreign counterpart is
m = Em +
1
2"








f (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) + (2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g:
(43)





















































































hold simultaneously. Or inequality (44) with sign > replacing sign > and inequality (45) with sign
> replacing sign > hold simultaneously. Otherwise, the global monetary policy given by Eqs. (42)
and (43) is ecient.
Proof. (1) To obtain Eqs.(42) and (43), we take logs to Eqs. (28) and (29) and get ^ y =
1
 [ log(1   g)   ] and ^ y = 1
 [ log(1   g)   ]. Then Eqs. (42) and (43) are obtained af-
ter we equate ^ y to y and ^ y to y, and express z and e in terms of m and m.
(2). Adding the term   1
E +
( 1)
2 [(2   )E log(1   g) + E log(1   g)] to both sides of
inequality (44) and   1
E+
( 1)
2 [E log(1   g) + (2   )E log(1   g)] to both sides of inequality
(45) and then rearranging both enlarged inequalities yield EU > E ^ U and EU  E ^ U. Similarly,
EU > E  U and EU > E  U can hold simultaneously. Either case means that there exists other
global monetary policy to Pareto dominate one given by Eqs. (42) and (43). Clearly, if neither case
holds, then the global monetary policy given by Eqs. (42) and (43) is ecient.
Comparison between the conclusion implied in OR (2000) and Proposition 2 shows that the
introduction of stochastic government spending can aect the eciency of the global monetary
policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages when monopoly distortions are com-
pletely eliminated. What Proposition 2 tells us seems dicult to understand at the rst sight.
After all, with the removal of dual distortions caused by sticky wages and monopoly distor-
tions, it seems that the individual's expected utility in the distortions-removed world should be
unconditionally higher than that in the distortions-remained world. But Proposition 2 clearly
tells us that the endogenous monetary policies to replicate real allocation under exible wages
and stochastic government spending shares are not globally optimal under some conditions when
19monopoly distortions both in labor and output markets are eliminated, why? The key is that
the monopoly distortions both in labor and output markets will decrease the disutility from labor
when the wages are sticky. The presence of stochastic government spending causes the benet
of a lower disutility from labor to outweigh adverse eect of monopoly distortions on expected
utility from consumption.21 The greater is the rm's monopoly power (a higher mark-up 
 1),
the higher is the output price, and the individual will decrease the labor supply when facing a
lower real wage. A greater labor monopoly power (a higher mark-up
'
' 1, equivalently, a low-
er value of ') will make rm's demand for labor more stable22. The above analysis shows that
the disutility from labor when monopoly distortions both in output and labor markets are re-












with the term 1
 exp








rms our analysis. When the benet ( 1
 exp












enough, it leaves room for improvement to the endogenously chosen monetary polices given by Eqs.
(42) and (43). Under what conditions do inequalities (44) and (45) hold? Taking Taylor expansions
to the terms 1
 exp
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' on both sides
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The immediately above inequality indicates that following conditions should be satised: the
markups in both output and labor market are large; the expected values of the government spending
shares are large; the variances of the government spending shares satisfy voluntary participation
constraints; the variances of both Home exogenous monetary policy and it's Foreign counterpart
are small and close in values; the covariance between Home exogenous monetary policy and it's
Foreign counterpart is small; and the variances of productivity shocks are small. As before, these
21Here the presence of stochastic government spending is vital for our departure from the conclusion in OR







and the adverse ef-






. The net e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; which is approximated by zero after taking





. However, after introducing the stochastic government spending, the net
eect of monopoly distortions is 1
 exp
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is approximated by 1
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> 0; after we take Taylor expansions to
exp
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22Note that ' is the wage elasticity of labor demand.
23We can get a similar inequality from inequality (45) by taking the same steps.
20conditions are relevant in view of the voluntary participation constraints imposed in our model.
What would happen if the government lets the individuals reap the benet of a lower disutil-
ity from labor caused by monopoly distortions and endogenously chooses the monetary policy to
replicate real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government spending shares?
Proposition 3. If the government leaves the monopoly distortions to be intact and chooses endoge-
nously monetary policy after observing both productivity shocks K, K and scal spending shocks g
and g,then
(1): Home monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, stochastic gov-
ernment spending shares is
m = Em +
1
2"








f(2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) +  (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g;
(46)
and it's Foreign counterpart is
m = Em +
1
2"








f (1   ")(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) + (2    (1   "))(log(1   g)   E log(1   g))g:
(47)
(2):The global monetary policy given by Eqs. (46) and (47) is ecient.
Proof. (1):Both Eqs. (46) and (47) are identical to their counterparts in proposition 2, and can
be obtained by taking the same methods.
(2):Suppose that there exists other global monetary policy such that both EU > E ~ U and
EU > E ~ U hold simultaneously or both EU > E ~ U and EU > E ~ U hold simultaneously. From














































hold simultaneously. Given the conditions that ' > 1,  > 1,  > 1, 0 6  6 1, " > 0,
2
 > 0, 2
z > 0, 2
e > 0, 2
log(1 g) > 0 and 2
log(1 g) > 0, inequalities (48) and (49) can not hold
simultaneously. As a result, EU > E ~ U and EU > E ~ U can not hold simultaneously . Similarly
21EU > E ~ U and EU > E ~ U can not hold simultaneously. The above analysis contradicts that there
exists other global monetary policy to Pareto improve one given by Eqs. (46) and (47).
Comparison between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 shows that the monopoly distortions are
essential for the eciency of the global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under
exible wages and stochastic government spending shares. In addition, the government uses the
same monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government
spending shares irrespective of monopoly distortions. The result comes from separability of eect of
monopoly distortions on ~ y from other factor's eects on the same ~ y. The marked dierence between
Proposition 3 and Propositions 1 and 2 is that the global monetary policy given in Proposition 3
is ecient. By contrast, those given in Propositions 1 and 2 can be Pareto improved under some
conditions.
Now we say something more on the monetary policies in Proposition 3. When  = 0 (no trad-
able goods), or " = 1 (no over/undershooting), a country's monetary policy will only respond to it's
own productivity shock and government spending shock. In addition, the Home government will
use an expansionary monetary policy as a response to Home positive productivity shock. But the
same productivity shock will elicit a contractionary Foreign monetary policy response when " > 1.
As far as government spending shock is concerned, the Home government will use a contractionary
monetary policy as a response to Home positive government spending shock, and the same govern-
ment spending shock will result in an expansionary Foreign monetary policy response when " > 1.
However, as showed by implied aggregate global monetary policy
m + m = Em + Em  
1
"









[(log(1   g)   E log(1   g)) + (log(1   g)   E log(1   g))];
the positive productivity shock whether occurred in the Home or Foreign will lead to expansion-
ary net global monetary response. By comparison, the positive government spending shock whether
occurred in the Home or Foreign will cause contractionary net global monetary response.
In OR (2000), the government can attain the highest expected utility using the combination
of subsidy and monetary policies to replicate the real allocation under exible wages but without
monopoly distortions. After we introduce the stochastic government spending shares, the govern-
ment can still replicate the real allocation under exible wages, stochastic government spending
shares but without monopoly distortions by the combination of subsidy policies that eliminate
monopoly distortions and monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages
and stochastic government spending shares. But the expected utility provided by monetary policy
that replicates the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government spending shares
when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated is lower than that provided by the same
global monetary policy accompanied by specially-chosen subsidy policies. Two types of subsidy
policies can be specially chosen, they are either the combination of a proportional wage subsidy of
'




















 1 and a proportional produc-
22tion subsidy of 
 1 exp[E log(1   g)]   1.24 Is the global monetary policy that replicates the real
allocation under exible wages and stochastic government spending shares when the governments
adopt the above-mentioned subsidy policies ecient? By the same methods that we use in the
proof of Proposition 2, we can conclude that the global monetary policy in this circumstance can
be Pareto improved when the same conditions are satised as those in Proposition 2. Otherwise, it
is ecient.
6. The scal policy
The results in last section demonstrate that the government can choose endogenously monetary
policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government spending
shares. Can the government chooses endogenously scal policy to achieve the same purpose?
Proposition 4. The government can't choose endogenously scal policy to replicate the real allo-
cation under exible wages, stochastic government spending shares, irrespective of monopoly distor-
tions. Even if the government makes choice after observing productivity shocks K, K and monetary
shocks M and M.
Proof. From the expressions (28), (29), (32) and (33), we know that these real allocations all
depend on the stochastic government spending shares. It's obvious that the government can't
replicate them with endogenously-chosen scal policy.
The result here is somewhat like that obtained in Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), but in a
more simple way.
7. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the eciency of global monetary policy in a two-country gener-
al equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and wage stickiness. We found that, when
the government keeps the monopoly distortions to be intact and endogenously chooses the mon-
etary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, constant government spending
shares, the global monetary policy is ecient under the conditions log(1   gc) > E log(1   g)
and log(1   g
c) > E log(1   g). But under the conditions log(1   gc) < E log(1   g) and
log(1   g
c) < E log(1   g), it can be either ecient or Pareto improved depending on whether
some requirements are satised. As compared with the conclusion implied in OR (2000, 2002) that
global monetary policy that replicates the real allocation under exible wages when monopoly dis-
tortions are completely eliminated is ecient, after we introduce stochastic government spending,
the global monetary policy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, stochastic govern-
ment spending shares when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated can be Pareto improved
when some conditions are satised. Otherwise, it is ecient. The reason is that the monopoly dis-
tortions both in labor and output markets will decrease the disutility from labor when the wages
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23are sticky. The presence of stochastic government spending causes the benet of a lower disutility
from labor to outweigh adverse eect of monopoly distortions on expected utility from consump-
tion. The complete elimination of monopoly distortions in labor and output markets will remove
the potentially large gains when stochastic government spending is present. The distinction be-
tween our nding and what is implied in OR (2000, 2002) indicates that the stochastic government
spending can aect the eciency of global monetary policy with which the government replicates
the real allocation under exible wages when monopoly distortions are completely eliminated. How-
ever, when the government endogenously chooses monetary policy to replicate the real allocation
under exible wages, stochastic government spending shares when monopoly distortions are intact,
as in OR (2000, 2002), the global monetary policy is ecient. Comparison of the conclusion in
Proposition 2 and that in Proposition 3 shows, unlike what is implied in OR (2000, 2002), that the
monopoly distortions can also aect the eciency of global monetary policy.
Another departure from OR (2000, 2002) is the global monetary policy that replicates the
real allocation under exible wages and stochastic government spending shares when monopoly
distortions are completely eliminated provides less utility than the same global monetary policy
when the government chooses special subsidy policies. However, the global monetary policy with
the specially-chosen subsidy policies can also be Pareto improved by exogenous global monetary
policy when some conditions are satised. Otherwise, it is ecient.
As far as scal policy is concerned, the government can't choose endogenously the scal pol-
icy to replicate the real allocation under exible wages, stochastic government spending shares,
irrespective of monopoly distortions.
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